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Using History to Reshape the Discussion of 
Judicial Review 
On September 26,1957, a memorable image dominated the 
front page of The New York Times: nine African-American 
children mounted the front steps of Little Rock Central High 
School, guarded by U.S. soldiers bearing rifles with fixed bayo- 
nets.' Behind this image lay a century-long struggle of African- 
Americans to wrest from their neighbors the political and legal 
equality guaranteed by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif- 
teenth Arnendment~.~ In many respects, the struggle to deseg- 
regate Central High was political, as well as moral and consti- 
tutional. It pitted blacks against whites, the North against the 
South, and the government of the United States against the 
government of Arkansas. Despite its deeply political character, 
however, the dispute was submitted for resolution to the Unit- 
ed States Supreme C0u1-t.~ 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed the American transforma- 
tion of political conflicts into legal cases more than a century 
ago: "There is hardly a political question in the United States 
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one."4 This 
transformation gives American judges "immense political pow- 
erY5 which they exercise perhaps most significantly in the 
form of judicial review? An American judge wields tremendous 
1. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1957, at  Al. 
2. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I), supple- 
mented by Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown In;  Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); 
In re Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); ERIC FONER, RECON- 
STRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988); RICHARD 
KLUGE& SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND 
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALP~Y (1976); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987); 
J. HARVIE W I ~ N S O N  111, FROM BROWN TO BAKISE: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954-1978 (1979). 
3. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358, U.S. 1 (1958). 
4. AL,EXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270 (J.P. Mayer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1966). 
5. Id. at 100. 
6. See id. at 100-01. Judicial review has been called "the most distinctive 
American contribution to the entire history of Western constitutionalism," although 
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political power when he reviews a statute and finds it uncon- 
stitutional. The controversies sparked by the exercise of that 
power have generated a large and lively body of scholarship.' 
Much of the scholarship on judicial review focuses on a 
single question: 'Was the judicial review authority asserted in 
Marbury v. Madison a usurpation [of legislative or executive 
authority]?"' That question has several facets, including close- 
ly related inquiries into the historic& and democraticlo legit- 
imacy of judicial review. An inquiry into the historical legitima- 
cy of judicial review focuses on Marbury v. Madison" because 
in that case the Supreme Court first announced its authority to  
review congressional statutes on the basis of their constitution- 
ality.12 A conventional interpretation of Marbury is that the 
Supreme Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Marshall, 
invented judicial review without supporting precedent or signif- 
at  least one author traces its theoretical roots to eighteenth-century French 
physiocrats. MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 103 (1988); J.M. KEUY, 
A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 279-80 (1992). Leaving aside the 
question of its origins, the American variety of judicial review has wielded remark- 
able international influence, especially on the postwar development of strong su- 
preme courts in India and Japan and, to a lesser extent, on the establishment of 
constitutional courts in Western Europe. See Donald P. Kommers, Judicial Review: 
Its Influence A b d ,  428 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. &I. 52, 59 (1976). 
7. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION F THE FOUR- 
TEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 
(1932); WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLPTICS AND THE CONSTITUTION W THE HIS~ORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1953); JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); SANFORD 
LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? (1994) [hereinaRer PERRY, THE C O N ~ I O N  IN 
THE COURTS]; MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COUWTS, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL PO ICYMAKING BY 
THE JUDICIARY (1982); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend- 
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Paul Brest, The Misconceived @est for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Edward S. Corwin, 
Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine of Judicial Review, 12 MIcH. L. REV. 538 
(1914); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an  Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 
703 (1975); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HAW. L. REV. 129 (1893); Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutml Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAW. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
8. GERALD GUNTHE& CONSTITUTIONAL L W 13 (12th ed. 1991) (italics added). 
9. See id. 
10. See id. at 19. 
11. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
12. Id. at 177-78. 
JUDICIAL REWIEW 
icant historical antecedent.13 A statement by Professor Wil- 
liam Crosskey epitomizes this interpretation: "[Jludicial review 
of Congressional acts was not intended, or provided, in the 
Constitution."" If true, this conventional interpretation of 
Marbury makes judicial review the most significant ipse dizit 
in American law. 
This Comment, which questions that conventional inter- 
pretation of Marbury, focuses on three questions. First, what 
did the men who wrote, debated, and ratified the Constitution 
say about judicial review?'' Second, what do those statements 
reveal about the role they thought judicial review would play in 
the American constitutional system? Third, what conclusions 
can be drawn from this historical inquiry for today's discussion 
of judicial review? 
This Comment demonstrates that many of those who wrote 
and ratified the Constitution made trenchant and suggestive 
remarks about judicial review and the role that they anticipat- 
ed it would play in the new constitutional order. Despite other 
disagreements, even over the wisdom of ratifying the Constitu- 
tion, the overwhelming majority of the Founders who said any- 
thing about judicial review agreed on a particular theory of it. 
Based on such historical evidence, this Comment offers two 
modest proposals intended to reshape the contemporary discus- 
sion of judicial review. First, it proposes to use the theory of 
13. See, e.g., 1 BOUDIN, supra note 7, at  223-24; ROBERT L. CLINTON, 
MARBURY V. &~LIISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5-6 (1989); 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 7, 
at 1000; HAND, supra note 7, at 6-11. 
14. 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 7, at 1000. 
15. James Hutson, the editor of the most recent supplement to THE RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION F 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinaf- 
ter RECORDS], has cast some doubt on the integrity of the most important records 
of the Founding, including James Madison's NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 (James Madison rep., W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1966), and 
Jonathan Elliot's THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE AD- 
OPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CON- 
VENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot coll. & rev., reprint ed., Ayer 
Co. 1987) (2d ed. 1888). ."[I]n all cases the resulting documents are not full, reli- 
able records of the debates at the Constitutional and ratifying conventions." James 
H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary Re- 
cord, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986). Hutson's basic point is that "the mere fact that 
a record is-in print does not make it reliable." Id. at  39. As Hutson reminds us, 
human record keeping is imperfect. But learning all we can from the records of 
the Founders remains nonetheless indispensable if we are to understand the Con- 
stitution they wrote. Imperfect as the records may be, we have no other guide to 
the thinking of those constitutional architects whose framework of national political 
life has sheltered our nation for more than two centuries. 
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judicial review shared by many Founders as the appropriate 
reference point for a well-formed discussion of judicial review. 
Second, it proposes to truncate the current form of the discus- 
sion of judicial review by lopping off two extreme positions: 
legislative deference and policymaking discretion. To explain 
and defend these proposals, this Comment will first revisit the 
Hand-Wechsler debate, one of the landmark episodes in the 
development of constitutional theory since 1945. As part of 
taking up that debate, it will describe how two extreme posi- 
tions in today's discussion of judicial review depend on the 
same interpretation of Marbury. Next, it will undermine that 
interpretation by presenting and discussing several remarks 
made in the Constitutional Convention, in the popular press 
during the ratification process, and in some of the state ratify- 
ing conventions. Finally, after articulating the theory of judicial 
review that these statements reveal, this Comment will argue 
that this early theory should be treated as the appropriate 
reference point for any serious contemporary discussion of judi- 
cial review. It will suggest further that today's discussion of 
judicial review should be reshaped by abandoning the extreme 
positions of legislative deference and policymaking discretion, 
given their common foundation on false history. 
Judicial review is so often discussed that a brief explana- 
tion of some preliminary matters may forestall potential mis- 
understandings. 
First, judicial review is customarily associated with history 
under the heading of "Originali~m."'~ This Comment makes 
no attempt to describe "the original theory of judicial review," 
whatever that might be. Nor does it pass judgment on 
Originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation. The 
difference between my use of history in this Comment and the 
use to which history is generally put in the service of 
Originalism turns on the distinction between making use of 
history to enlighten the discussion of judicial review and con- 
ceiving of judicial review in terms of history." Nor, finally, 
does this Comment address in more general terms the proper 
16. See generally INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGI- 
NAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (collecting several well-known essays on 
Originalism). 
17. Cf. Michael Oakeshott, The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence, 3 
POLITICA 203, 208 (1938) (distinguishing between a jurisprudence that makes use of 
history and one that conceives of jurisprudence in terms of history). 
JUDICIAL WVIEW 
use of history by the Supreme Court when it adjudicates cases 
under the Constitution.18 Instead this Comment proposes to  
use history to reshape the scholarly discussion of judicial re- 
view as it is mainly, although not exclusively, carried on among 
constitutional theorists. 
Second, this Comment proceeds with two assumptions 
about history: historical evidence can prove or disprove histori- 
cal opinions, and history is relevant to  a serious discussion of 
judicial review. Some commentators, such as Michael Perry, 
have cast doubt on the relevance of history to the discussion of 
judicial review. 
The debate about whether the Constitution establishes 
judicial review has limited relevance today. The practice of 
judicial review, including the modern practice of judicial re- 
view of federal acts, has indisputably become a definite fea- 
ture of American governmentiindeed, a feature we unreserv- 
edly hold out as a model to the world. Any argument that 
judicial review was not established by the Constitution and is, 
in that sense, "unconstitutional," however plausible the argu- 
ment may be as  an historical matter, is, a t  this point in the 
development of American political institutions and practices, 
antiquarian. In the sense that judicial review is now a defini- 
tive feature of American government-a constitutive fea- 
ture-judicial review is ~onstitutional.'~ 
To some extent Perry is right, but he misses an important 
point. Significant positions in the discussion of the proper scope 
and exercise of judicial review rely on historical interpretations 
that can be supported or undermined through historical inqui- 
ry. Unlike Perry's straw man, this Comment will not make a 
two-step move from "Judicial review has (or lacks) historical 
support" to the conclusion "Judicial review should be exercised 
(or abandoned)." Instead it will make three moves: from "the 
Supreme Court's articulation of judicial review in Marbury u. 
Madison has strong historical support" to "rhetorical positions 
inconsistent with the previous claim must be rejected" to  the 
conclusion, "the discussion of judicial review should be re- 
shaped to  reflect the rejection of such positions." In short, an 
inquiry into the historical antecedents of Marbury is no mere 
18. See generally Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Mair, 
1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119 (criticizing the Court's use of history in constitutional 
adjudication). 
19. PERRY, CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS, supra note 7, at 26. 
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academic exercise. Once the practice of judicial review is taken 
for granted, the proper scope of the exercise of judicial review 
remains debatable. And it  is that debate that the historical 
inquiry contained in this Comment is intended to reshape. 
Third, this Comment travels over historical ground that 
other writers have also surveyed at  length?' But repeated 
presentation of historical evidence showing that the Founders 
anticipated the Supreme Court's exercise of judicial review in 
Marbury has been so far unable to stifle what Hart and Wechs- 
ler called "the curiously persisting myth of us~rpation."~' An- 
other presentation of similar historical evidence may not per- 
suade every reader that the Supreme Court did not usurp the 
power of judicial review, but it may persuade some readers to 
reconsider how they discuss judicial review. If so, it will have 
served a worthwhile purpose. Besides, a summary of the histor- 
ical evidence would provide an insufficient foundation for the 
theoretical proposals a t  the heart of this Comment. 
Finally, while other writers have moved from history to 
 the^$^ in a manner resembling the move made in this Com- 
20. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
15-72 (1938); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969); CLINTON, 
supm note 13, at 56-71; SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE 
CONSMTUTION 38-44, 78-83 (1990); CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSJXTU- 
TION, AND THE SUPREME COURT 49-70 (new rev. & enlarged ed. 1935). 1 began 
researching this Comment by delving into the primary sources to learn what the 
Founders said and wrote about judicial review. My study of secondary materials 
deliberately came later. Only when my research and writing based on primary 
sources was all but completed did I discover, not surprisingly, that other scholars 
have addressed similar historical questions. However, the historical conclusions of 
this Comment were first feached independently. That I interpreted the historical 
evidence like other scholars before knowing of their work tends to strengthen my 
conclusions. As the Apostle Paul wrote, "In the mouth of two or three witnesses 
shall every word be established." 2 Corinthians 13:l (King James). 
21. PAUL M. BATOR El' AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 8 (3d ed. 1988). 
22. When the historical research for this Comment was nearly f ~ s h e d ,  I
happened to find two recently-published books whose arguments move from history 
to theory, a move which generally resembles the one that I propose to make: 
CLINTON, supra note 13, and SNOWISS, supra note 20. Both authors review similar, 
ofkn identical, historical evidence. Yet they reach opposite conclusions. Clinton ar- 
gues that the modern interpretation of Marbury as the fountainhead of judicial 
innovation is historically incorrect and that it has led to an unduly broad concep- 
tion of judicial review. See CLINTON, supra note 13, at 223-33. Snowiss contends, 
however, that Marbury represents a genuine innovation by the Marshall Court, 
SNOWISS, supra note 20, at vii-viii, and that the most appropriate modern concep- 
tion of judicial review combines "the judicial defense of fundamental values . . . 
with some form of restraint." Id. at 216. 
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ment, no other writer has employed that move to reach the 
same conclusions. 
11. DEBATE OVER HISTORICAL ~ G I T I M A C Y  AND ITS 
CONNECTION WITH TWO EXTREME CONCEPTIONS 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The significance of the legitimacy debate was highlighted 
during one of the most controversial moments in twentieth- 
century constitutional history: the Supreme Court's decision in 
Brown v. Board of Edu~a t ion .~~  Brown generated extraordi- 
nary theoretical debate over the historical legitimacy of judicial 
review.24 
One of the best-known debates over the historical legitima- 
cy of judicial review occurred a few years after Brown was 
decided.25 Judge Learned Hand delivered the Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School in 1958;26 Professor 
Herbert Wechsler responded in the Holmes Lectures the follow- 
ing year2' 
Hand's main historical claim was that the Constitutional 
Convention probably would not have enacted an express grant 
of judicial review "if the issue had been put to it that courts 
should have power to  invalidate acts of Congre~s."~~ Based on 
this historical claim, as well as on textual arguments, Judge 
Hand magisterially denied the legitimacy of judicial review. 
This Comment does not try to settle the difference of opinion between Clinton 
and Snowiss. Although it concludes that the historical evidence supports Clinton's 
opinion, it addresses a slightly different question than the one Snowiss addresses: 
Did Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury change the theory of judicial review 
previously expressed by the Founders? This Comment focuses instead on whether 
those who wrote and ratified the Constitution said enough about judicial review to 
provide reasonably clear evidence of (1) their intention that federal courts should 
exercise judicial review and (2) their theory of judicial review. Therefore, my re- 
search provides no basis to evaluate Snowiss's thesis. 
23. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I) ,  supplemented by Brown v. Board of Educ., 
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown IT). 
24. For an interesting treatment of the relationship between Brown u. Buard 
of Education and the debates over the legitimacy of judicial review, see MORTON J. 
Ho~wrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960, at 258-68 (1992). 
25. Horwitz and Gunther both treat the Hand-Wechsler debate as a key epi- 
sode in the history of questioning the legitimacy of judicial review. Id.; GUNTHER, 
supm note 8,  at 18-19. 
26. The text of Judge Hand's lectures can be found at HAND, supra note 7 .  
27. The text of Professor Wechsler's lectures can be found at Wechsler, supra 
note 7 .  
28. HAND, supra note 7, at 7. 
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There was nothing in the United States Constitution that 
gave courts any authority to review the decisions of Congress; 
and i t  was a plausible-indeed to my mind an unanswer- 
able-argument that it invaded the "Separation of Powers" 
which, as so many then believed, was the condition of all free 
government." 
Professor Wechsler responded a year later in his Holmes 
Lectures by noting that the historical evidence he and Henry 
Hart had gathered pointed towards the opposite conc l~s ion .~~  
"The grant of judicial power was to include the power, where 
necessary in the decision of cases, to disregard state or federal 
statutes found to be unconstitutional. Despite the curiously 
persisting myth of usurpation, the Convention's understanding 
on this point emerges from its records with singular clarity."31 
Wechsler also cited a book reviews2 by Hart in which Hart 
wrote a devastating critique of Crosskey's argument that  the 
Founders had not intended to grant federal courts the power of 
judicial review.33 From this historical evidence Wechsler con- 
cluded, "I have not the slightest doubt respecting the legitimacy 
of judicial review, whether the action called in question in a 
case which otherwise is proper for adjudication is legislative or 
executive, federal or state."34 
Despite appearances, the legitimacy debate carries more 
than academic interest. As Gerald Gunther has observed, ''eval- 
uations of the content as well as the timing of contemporary 
court decisions may evolve from discussions beginning with 
concern over legitimacy."35 A hotly contested aspect of the dis- 
cussion of judicial review focuses on the scope of its exercise. 
29. Id. at 10-11. 
30. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 5 11.13. 
31. HENRY HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 14 (1st ed. 1953). 
32. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 5 11.13 (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., Professor 
Crosskey and Judicial Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954) (reviewing 2 
CROSSKEY, supra note 7). 
33. See supm text accompanying note 14. Crosskey's arguments and Hart's 
response may be taken as a less famous, though no less interesting, episode in the 
history of the legitimacy debate. Both were published less than five years before 
Judge Hand delivered his Holmes Lectures. They therefore form a useful and un- 
duly neglected companion to the more famous Hand-Wechsler debate. 
34. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 2. 
35. GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 18. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
At one extreme stands the Supreme Court's statement of 
its judicial supremacy in Cooper u. Aaron? There the Court 
wrote, "This decision [Marbury] declared the basic principle 
that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the 
law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been 
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional ~ystern.''~' By label- 
ing the Cooper Court's statement of judicial supremacy "ex- 
treme," I condone neither the unlawful actions of Governor 
Faubus nor the racism that  gave those actions their perverse 
force. I merely use the label to indicate a common reading of 
Cooper as an overly ambitious statement of the Court's place in  
the constitutional system.38 
At the other extreme stands the Supreme Court's state- 
ment in Williamson u. Lee Optical: 
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state 
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, be- 
cause they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony 
with a particular school of thought. . . . "For protection 
against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the 
polls, not to the courts."3g 
This passage denotes the Court's rejection of substantive due 
process as applied to legislation regulating economic conduct. 
But it also connotes a more general point: an approach to judi- 
cial review founded on legislative deference. 
Both extremes4' depend on the premise that  the Court 
lacked an historical basis for its opinion in Marbury. The Wil- 
liamson position--courts should defer to the legislature when 
exercising judicial review-corresponds to Judge Hand's argu- 
36. 358 US. 1 (1958). 
37. Id. at 18. 
38. See, e.g., Sanford Levins'on, Conversing About Justice, 100 YALE L.J. 1855, 
1872 n.110 (1991) (reviewing JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION (1990)) 
(rejecting the Cooper Court's claim to interpretive supremacy as "papalist"). 
39. 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 
(1876)) (citations omitted). 
40. Incidentally, it is probably no accident that Cooper, a civil rights case, is 
the high-water mark of judicial supremacy and Williamson, a property rights case, 
is the low-water mark. See id. at  485-90; Cooper, 358 U.S. at  16-17. The modern 
Supreme Court has distinguished between personal and property rights, scrutiniz- 
ing legislation in the former category and barely reviewing legislation in the latter. 
See, e.g., Griswold v. Co~ed icu t ,  381 US. 479, 481-82 (1965); United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 US. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
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ment, which explicitly followed from the claim that Marbury 
lacked historical legitimacy." And the Cooper Court relied on 
an interpretation of Marbury that  a t  least one commentator 
calls "ahistorical" in its over-expansive conception of judicial 
authority.42 The same commentator associates the broad read- 
ing of Marbury expressed by Cooper with the claim that 
Marbury lacked historical legi t i rna~y.~~ "According to this con- 
struction [of Marbury], since judicial review originated from a 
coup d'etat, engineered for political purposes, Marbury is the 
primary antecedent for judicial policymaking in the modern 
era. . . . Marbury has become shorthand for judicial supremacy, 
as If historical inquiry demonstrated that the Found- 
ers anticipated that federal courts would exercise judicial re- 
view, these extreme conceptions of judicial review could be dis- 
missed as  equally unsound. Contemporary discussion of the 
proper scope and exercise of judicial review could then proceed 
along less polemical, more useful paths. 
A. Historical Origins 
The convention that produced the Constitution originated 
in 1785 when the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia tried to 
regulate navigation on the Potomac and Pocomoke Rivers, as 
well as on Chesapeake Bay.'5 Commissioners representing 
Maryland and Virginia met and soon realized that  they could 
not intelligently regulate interstate navigation without the 
authority to establish a navy or impose tariffs? On the advice 
of its commissioners, the Virginia legislature passed a resolu- 
tion in January 1786 that appointed representatives to meet 
with representatives of the other states to devise "a uniform 
41. See Williamson, 348 US. at  488; HAND, supra note 7, at  6-7, 10-11. How- 
ever, Wechsler's conception of judicial review bears no resemblance to the Court's 
statement of its power in Cooper. On the contrary, Wechsler saw judicial review in 
very different terms indeed. T h e  duty, to be sure, is not that of policing or advis- 
ing legislatures or executives . . . . It is the duty to decide the litigated case and 
to decide it in accordance with the law . . . ." Wechsler, supra note 7, at  6. 
42. CLINTON, supra note 13, at  15. 
43. See id. at 192; id. at  14-15. 
44. Id. at  219-20. 
45. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSITTUTION F THE UNITED 
STATES 105 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (abr. ed. 1833). 
46. Id. 
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system in their commercial relations.'"' Virginia's resolution 
was sent to  the other states, but only four states responded. 
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and P e ~ s y l v a n i a  met with 
Virginia to discuss common trade problems.48 
After meeting at Annapolis, Maryland, representatives of 
these five states determined that they could not resolve their 
trade problems by themselves because they lacked the neces- 
sary powers and because not every state was repre~ented .~~ 
Therefore, they submitted a report to all the states and to Con- 
gress recommending the appointment of commissioners to con- 
sider the "state of the union" under the Articles of Confedera- 
tion?' 
Virginia immediately appointed delegates to meet accord- 
ingly." But the resolution was delivered to an inert Congress 
and languished until New York presented a motion in Congress 
requiring that all states meet to revise and propose amend- 
ments to the Articles of C~nfederation.~~ On February 21, 
1787, Congress finally passed a resolution authorizing what 
has come to be called the Constitutional or Philadelphia Con- 
vention. 
Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient 
that on the second Monday in May next a Convention of dele- 
gates who shall have been appointed by the several States be 
held at  Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of revis- 
ing the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress 
and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions 
therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by 
the States render the federal Constitution adequate to the 
exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Un- 
ion.53 
The Convention first met at Philadelphia in the State 
House on May 14 th .~  But eleven days passed before the quo- 
rum of seven states55 had gathered so that the Convention 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 106. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. See d. 
52. Id. at 106-07. 
53. Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787, 32 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 1774-1789, at 74 
(Roscoe R. Hill ed., reprint ed. 1968) (footnotes omitted). 
54. See 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 1. 
55. See 1 id. at 3. 
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could proceed with its business. Once it began in earnest, the 
Convention regularly met between May 25th and September 
17th, debating what form of government would best suit the 
American states.56 
On May 29, 1787, barely two weeks into the proceedings, 
Virginia's Governor, Edmund Randolph, introduced fifteen 
resolutions, known collectively as the Virginia Plan.57 A day 
later the delegates confronted the scope of their own authority 
in deciding whether the Articles of Confederation could be sat- 
isfactorily-amended. Congress had authorized the delegates to 
meet "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles 
of Confederati~n,"~~ yet some doubted whether this authoriza- 
tion could or should be adhered to. Charles Cotesworth Pink- 
ney of South Carolina reminded the delegates that the Conven- 
tion had not been authorized t o  discuss the construction of a 
government "founded on different principles from the federal 
Constit~tion"~~ (by which he evidently meant the Articles of 
Confederation). George Mason of Virginia disagreed. He argued 
that the Confederation lacked the essential power to compel 
"delinquent  state^"^' to  obey the Articles and that it would 
continue to lack that power until a national government could 
"directly operate on individuals*' rather than on states, as 
the Articles of Confederation then authorizedea2 In the end, 
the delegates decided to  exceed the express terms of their con- 
gressional mandate, resolving "that a national Governt. ought 
to  be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive 
& Judic ia r~ . '~~  
B. Judicial Review and the Council of Revision 
In the records of the Constitutional Convention, the con- 
cept of judicial review appears most often in debates about the 
Council of Revision. The Council originated with the eighth 
resolution of the Virginia Plan, which proposed the creation of 
56. See 1 id. at 1; 2 id. at 649. 
57. See 1 id. at 22-23. 
58. Resolution of Feb. 21, 1787, supra note 53, at 74. 
59. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 34. 
60. 1 id. 
61. 1 id. 
62. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, arts. 11, 111, reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL & LEGAL HISTORY 69, 70 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 
1989). 
63. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 35. 
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a "council of revision"64 composed of "the Executive and a con- 
venient number of the National Judi~iary."~~ It would be given 
the authority to  review every act of Congress, whether previ- 
ously passed or vetoed? If an a d  was previously passed, the 
Council could veto it and Congress could then revive the act 
only by passing it again." If previously vetoed, the Council 
could reenact the legislation, unless it was vetoed again by a 
certain percentage (presumably to  be worked out at the Con- 
vention) of each branch of Congress? This resolution soon 
attracted heated debate. 
On June 4th, while meeting as a Committee of the Whole, 
the Convention considered the proposed Council of Revi~ion.~~ 
According to Madison's record, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts 
spoke first." Gerry expressed doubt whether the Council 
ought to include federal judges, reasoning that they would have 
enough power to repel "encroachments" on their authority "by 
their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding 
on their Constit~tionalit~."~~ He further noted that some state 
courts had already exercised similar power, a suggestion that 
received "general approbation."" Rufus King, also of Massa- 
chusetts, agreed. He thought that judges should not have a 
veto because they would be already empowered to "stop the 
operation of such [laws] as shall appear repugnant to  the con- 
s t i t~t ion."~~ 
The next time the idea of judicial review arose in the con- 
text of the debates on the Council of Revision was on July 
21st .~~ James Wilson of Pennsylvania again proposed that fed- 
64. 1 id. at 21. 
65. 1 d. When the Convention met, New York had a Council of Revision for 
determining questions of constitutionality. It was composed of members of the Ex- 
ecutive and Judiciary and may have been the model for the Virginia Plan's propos- 
al. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOWS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTEUECTUAL ORIGINS 
OF THE C O N S T ~ O N  85 (1985). 
66. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 21. 
67. 1 id. 
68. 1 id. 
69. 1 id. at 97 (emphasis omitted). 
70. 1 id. 
71. 1 id. 
72. 1 id. But see Thayer, supra note 7, at 132-34 (discussing the surprise and 
opposition that greeted the doctrine of judicial review during the late eighteenth 
century in Rhode Island, New York, Vermont, and Co~edicut). 
73. 1 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 109. 
74. 2 id. at 73. 
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era1 judges sit on the Co~ncil,'~ despite the Convention's earli- 
er rejection of the same proposal.76 He returned to Mr. Gerry's 
argument7' (without expressly citing it) that federal judges 
would have enough power to protect their institutional integri- 
ty through their authority "as expositors of the  law^.'"^ Wil- 
son admitted that this argument had some weight.79 However, 
he contended that the power of judges to  declare a law uncon- 
stitutional "did not go far enough."80 He worried that laws 
could be "unwise," "dangerous," or "destructive," without being 
"so unconstitutional as to  justify the Judges in refusing to give 
them effect."81 
Wilson did not disagree with Gerry about whether the 
federal judiciary would exercise judicial review; the more press- 
ing question for Wilson was whether judicial review provided a 
sufficient check on legislative excesses. He concluded, contrary 
to Gerry, that it did not. 
In response to Wilson,. Luther Martin of Maryland "con- 
sidered the association of the Judges with the Executive as a 
dangerous inn~vation."~~ Martin argued that federal judges 
would address "the Constitutionality of laws"83 as part of their 
ordinary judicial function and that they would exercise "a neg- 
ative on the laws"* as a matter of course. Placing judges on 
the Council of Revision would give them "a double negati~e":'~ 
federal judges would exercise the power of judicial review as 
part of their ordinary jurisdiction and hold veto power by virtue 
of their place on the Council of Revisiod6 
75. 2 id. 
76. 1 id. at 140 (recording the June 6th vote against the proposal that fed- 
eral judges sit on the Council of Revision). 
77. 1 id. at 97. 
78. 2 id. at 73. 
79. 2 id. 
80. 2 id. 
81. 2 id.; see also Thayer, supra note 7, at 155-56 (arguing that the Consti- 
tution does not effectively restrain Congress and state legislatures from doing 
"harm and evil" and that the remedy lies with the people, not the courts.) 
82. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 76. 
83. 2 id. 
84. 2 id. 
85. 2 id. 
86. While equal in power, these two forms of legislative veto were not equal 
in fad. A place on the Council of Revision would have given federal judges an 
opportunity to veto statutes before they were enacted. Judicial review, if exercised 
at  all, would be exercised only after enactment. A place on the Council would have 
therefore conferred a "first in time* advantage in comparison to judicial review. 
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James Madison thought that Martin's discomfort with the 
blending of judicial and executive power failed to take into 
account the need for each department to mount "effectual barri- 
ers"? to maintain their original separation. George Mason of 
Virginia then argued, contrary to Luther Martin, that  giving 
judges a place on the Council of Revision would lead to better 
legislatiod8 Without that place on the Council, judges could 
affect legislation in only a few instances. "They could declare 
an unconstitutional law void. But with regard to every law 
however unjust oppressive or pernicious, which did not come 
plainly under this description, they would be under the necessi- 
ty as Judges to give it a free co~rse."'~ 
Almost a month later the concept of judicial review arose 
again during debates on the Council of Revision. On August 
15th, John Francis Mercer, a newly-arrivedg0 delegate from 
Maryland, "disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as 
expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare 
a law void."g1 Instead he thought that laws ought to be care- 
fully drafted "and then to be unc~ntroulable."~~ John Dickin- 
son of Delaware agreed-to a point. "He thought no such power 
[as judicial review] ought to exist.'*3 Unlike Mr. Mercer, how- 
ever, Dickinson could suggest no alternative to judicial re- 
view:4 implying that he found Mercer's alternative of unre- 
viewable laws unsatisfactory. 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania immediately replied 
that  "[hle could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of 
the Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation of 
the Constitution was law."95 The first half of Morris's 
statement is somewhat unclear, though he probably meant that 
judges wield executive power.96 The second half is fairly plain, 
87. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15,. at 77. 
88. 2 id. at 78. 
89. 2 id. 
90. 2 KZ. at 176. Mercer first attended the Convention proceedings on August 
6th. 2 id. 
91. 2 id. at 298. 
92. 2 id. 
93. 2 id. at 299. 
94. 2 id. 
95. 2 id. 
96. While this is a fair interpretation of Morris's statement, a well-known 
contemporaneous writer disputed the notion that judicial power is a subset of exec- 
utive power. JAMES WIISON, Of Government, in THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE 
JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. (1804, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 284, 
296 @obert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). 
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however. Morris thought it objectionable to force judges to 
validate unconstitutional laws. By this he may have meant that 
judicial review was essential, even if federal judges were per- 
mitted to sit on the Coun~il.~' 
The delegates' positions can be characterized in terms of 
the following categories. Gerry, King, and Martin thought that 
the grant of judicial power to the federal judiciary brought with 
it the power of judicial review. They thought that  including 
judges on the Council of Revision was unnecessary or danger- 
ous, the danger being a perceived violation of the principle of 
the separation of powers.ss Wilson and Mason thought that ju- 
dicial review did not go far enough, because it would not pre- 
vent Congress from passing unwise laws. They preferred judges 
to exercise judicial review and a legislative veto on the Council 
of Revision. 
The other positions are unique to individuals. Morris 
thought judicial review essential, even if judges sat on the 
Council. His acceptance of judicial review puts him in agree- 
ment with most other delegates who spoke about judicial re- 
view, but his opinion about the Council of Revision is ambigu- 
ous. The records contain insufficient information to fairly con- 
clude whether Morris favored or opposed judicial membership 
on the Council. But on the issue of judicial review, six dele- 
gates were agreed: the grant of judicial authority entailed the 
power of judicial review. Of the delegates whose statements I 
have discussed, only Dickinson and Mercer expressed any 
doubt about the desirability of letting judges exercise judicial 
review. At the same time, however, Dickinson admitted the 
absence of satisfactory alternatives to the exercise of judicial 
review. Of all the delegates, only Mercer completely opposed 
the concept of judicial review. 
An interesting question remains, however. Why did Madi- 
son and Wilson repeatedly propose the Council of Revision in  
the face of persistent opposition? Madison may have wanted to, 
include judges on the Council of Revision to avoid having to 
directly raise the issue of judicial review. In a letter to James 
Monroe, Madison wrote, "Such a Controul, restricted to Consti- 
tutional points, besides giving greater stability & system to the 
rules of expounding the Instrument, would have precluded the 
97. I owe this interpretive point to Professor David A. Thomas, whose course 
on Anglo-American History provided the occasion to write this Comment. 
98. See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 75-77. 
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question of a Judiciary annulment of Legislative Acts."gg One 
can only guess why Madison thought it desirable to  "preclude" 
the issue of judicial review. Perhaps he thought judicial review 
desirable notwithstanding its potential di~isiveness.'~ 
C. Judicial Review in Other Contexts 
On July 17th, two months into the Convention proceedings, 
the delegates considered whether to give the national legisla- 
ture the power t o  directly veto state laws.lO' Roger Sherman 
of Massachusetts thought the proposal unnecessary because 
"the Courts of the States would not consider as valid any law 
contravening the Authority of the Union, and which the legisla- 
ture would wish to  be negatived."lo2 By this Sherman appar- 
ently meant that the state courts would exercise judicial review 
and strike down unconstitutional state laws. Gouverneur Mor- 
ris was also opposed to the congressional veto. "A law that 
ought to  be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary 
departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a 
Nationl. law."lo3 Here Morris laid out two alternatives that 
he found preferable to a congressional veto on state laws: the 
exercise of judicial review by federal courts and the exercise of 
national legislative power by Congress. 
99. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (December 27, 1817), in 3 
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 424. 
100. I raise the possibility that Madison may have thought judicial review 
potentially divisive based on the work of Forrest McDonald. He wrote of political 
theory in the 1780s, "the notion that the judges should be so independent as to 
have power to overrule juries or to pass upon the constitutionality of laws enacted 
by legislative bodies was alien to American theory and practice." MCDONALD, supra 
note 65, at 85. However, judicial review turned out to  be less controversial than 
Madison thought: it was repeatedly mentioned during Convention debates without 
attracting more than a single instance of outright opposition. See supra text ac- 
companying note 91. In fact, Gordon Wood has chronicled how questioning the idea 
of legislative supremacy led Americans of the 1780s toward the concept of judicial 
review. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776- 
1787, at 455-63 (1969). More recently, Professor Wood has suggested that the idea 
of an independent judiciary was alien in the 1780s because its development was 
"[tlhe most dramatic institutional transformation in the early Republic." GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE &WZCALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 323 (1992). 
101. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 27. The entire text of the proposal reads, 
"'To negative all laws passed by the several States <contravening in the opinion of 
the Nat: Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the au- 
thority of ye Union.'>" 2 id. (footnote omitted). 
102. 2 id. 
103. 2 d. at 28. 
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The topic of judicial review also arose during debates on 
the proper mode of ratifying the Constit~tion.'~~ In its resolu- 
tion authorizing the Convention, Congress had specified that 
any amendments to  the Articles of Confederation would be ap- 
proved by the states.'05 But on July 23rd, the delegates took 
up the question anyway, considering whether state legislatures 
or specially-chosen ratifying conventions ought to have authori- 
ty to  ratify the Constituti~n.'~~ James Madison said that the 
choice embraced a fundamental political difference between 
kinds of political systems. "He considered the difference be- 
tween a system founded on the Legislatures only, and one 
founded on the people, to  be the true difference between a 
league or treaty, and a Constit~tion."'~' 
Madison perceived two advantages in terms of "political 
operation"'" that recommended the choice of ratifying con- 
ventions over state legislatures. First, if considered a treaty, 
the union of American states would be subject to  international 
law, which provides that a violation of any article of the treaty 
by any party frees all other parties from their obligations under 
the treaty.'Og This would perennially expose the union to  dis- 
solution. However, if considered a constitution, the union's laws 
would not be open to that interpretation, and the union would 
be less vulnerable. Second, if considered a treaty the Constitu- 
tion would not force judges to  invalidate laws that ran against 
it.''' On the contrary, "A law violating a constitution estab- 
lished by the people themselves, would be considered by the 
Judges as null & void.""' 
Madison's argument is especially interesting and signifi- 
cant in terms of locating the historical antecedents of Mar- 
bury v. Madison. Not only did Madison unambiguously state 
the doctrine of judicial review, but he did so as a strong reason 
in favor of conferring the ratifgring authority on special con- 
ventions rather than on state legislatures. At a deeper level, 
this argument means that Madison favored placing sovereignty 
squarely with "the people" rather than with the states. His 
See 2 id. at 88-93. 
Supra text accompanying note 53. 
See 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 88. 
2 id. at 93. 
2 id. 
2 id. 
2 id. 
2 id. 
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tacit assumption seems to  have been that whoever holds the 
authority to  ratify a constitution holds constitutive power itself, 
because ratification is simply the means of exercising that 
power. Few arguments could more persuasively give judicial 
review a critical place in the constitutional universe than the 
argument that judicial review is a necessary corollary of a 
constitution founded on popular sovereignty. Madison implicitly 
makes that argument here. 
One month later, on August 22nd, the delegates considered 
whether to  include in the Constitution express prohibitions 
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.112 Hugh Wil- 
liamson, a delegate from North Carolina, explained that the 
North Carolina Constitution included a prohibition on ex post 
facto laws and that, "tho it has been violated, it has done good 
there & may do good here, because the Judges can take hold of 
it."'13 This reference to  judicial review is veiled, but William- 
son probably meant that including a constitutional prohibition 
on ex post facto laws would give judges authority to strike 
down such laws through the practice of judicial review. 
Five days later the idea of judicial review again arose, this 
time in the course of a debate over the proper scope of the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction.'" The subject of debate was ar- 
ticle XI, section 3 of "the Report of the Committee of de- 
tail,""5 the direct antecedent of the first paragraph of the 
current version of Article 111, section 2.'16 The original lan- 
guage had read, 
The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all 
cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the 
United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Pub- 
lic Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of 
Officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more 
States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) 
between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citi- 
zens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens 
thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects."' 
112. 2 id. at 375-76. 
113. 2 id. at 376. 
114. 2 id. at 430-32. 
115. 2 id. at 177, 186-87, 430. 
116. See U.S. CONST. art. 111; 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 186-87, 575-76. 
117. 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 186. 
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James Madison and Gouverneur Morris moved to  amend the 
last clause of this passage t o  read, "to controversies [to which 
the U-S- shall be a party], between two or more States."'18 
The Convention accepted this amendment without objec- 
tion.'19 
Doctor William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut next pro- 
posed to  amend the first clause to read, "The Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court shall extend to  all cases arising under [this 
Constitution and the] laws passed by the legislature of the 
United But, Madison objected to Johnson's propos- 
al. He thought it probably extended the Court's jurisdiction too 
far by potentially allowing the Court to  hear cases not "of a 
Judiciary Nature,"12' or what we today would call nonjusti- 
ciable issues. Moreover, he argued, "The right of expounding 
the Constitution in cases not of this Cjudicial] nature ought not 
to be given to that Department."lz2 By this argument Madi- 
son lodged two independent objections to Johnson's proposed a- 
mendment. First, he understood the proposal to allow the Su- 
preme Court to hear nonjusticiable issues; he thought that such 
issues ought not come within the Court's jurisdiction. Second, 
he seems to  have understood that the Court would have "the 
right of expounding the Con~titution"'~ in every case over 
which it had jurisdiction, thus accepting judicial review only 
over justiciable cases. Put simply, Madison thought that John- 
son's proposed amendment extended the Court's jurisdiction too 
far in general and the reach of judicial review too far in partic- 
ular. Despite Madison's misgivings, the Convention adopted 
Johnson's amendment, "it being generally supposed that the 
jurisdiction given was constructively limited to  cases of a Judi- 
ciary nature."124 
Thus many delegates made statements of varying clarity 
and length about judicial review and the role they thought it 
would play in the new constitutional order. Taken together 
these statements suggest that judicial review was widely con- 
118. See 2 id. at 186-87, 430 (emphasis added to highlight the proposed 
amendment). 
119. 2 id. at 430. 
120. See 2 id. at 186, 430 (emphasis added to highlight the proposed amend- 
ment). 
121. 2 id. at 430. 
122. 2 id. 
123. 2 id. 
124. 2 id. 
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sidered a necessary consequence of the grant of federal judicial 
authority. Only two delegates, Mercer and Dickinson, made 
statements unfavorable t o  judicial review. From this evidence 
one should be persuaded that judicial review was neither 
strange nor tremendously controversial-despite Madison's 
fears.lZ5 Several delegates referred to judicial review, some- 
times at length and sometimes in passing, without raising 
more than a breath of opposition. What is more, those who 
made such references came from New England (Massachu- 
setts), the Middle Atlantic state of Pennsylvania, and the South 
(Virginia), thus excluding sectional biases as a motivation. And 
the group of delegates who spoke favorably of judicial review 
included both Federalists and Antifederalists.lZ6 As other 
commentators have observed, "[tlhe early Americans who were 
opposed to the power of judicial review were not among the na- 
tional leaders, and were too few in number to  constitute a ma- 
j ~ r i t ~ . " ~ ~ '  
Judicial review appears to have been uncontroversially 
accepted by nearly all the members of the Constitutional Con- 
vention. Why, then, did they not explicitly vest federal courts 
with the power of judicial review?12$ One reply is that the 
125. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
126. Forrest McDonald characterized the Convention delegates who spoke about 
judicial review as having "widely divergent political views." MCDONALD, supra note 
65, at 254. 
127. P. Allan Dionisopoulos & Paul Peterson, Rediscovering the American Ori- 
gins of Judicial Review, 18 J. MARSHALL.  REV. 49, 56 (1984). 
128. Had they wished to design an express bar against unconstitutional laws, 
the Convention delegates could have looked for precedent and guidance to an inter- 
esting episode in English history. While imprisoned at the Tower of London, John 
Lilburne and his Leveller colleagues, political radicals during the mid-seventeenth- 
century struggles over English sovereignty, wrote An Agreement of the Free People 
of England. This summary of their constitutional principles anticipated several 
rights later included in the American Bill of Rights. Compare, e.g., JOHN LILBURNE 
ET AL., AN AGREEMENT OF THE FREE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND (1649), reprinted in THE 
LEVELLERS IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 165 (G.E. Aylmer ed., 1975) (forbidding 
oficials to punish persons "for refusing to answer to questions against themselves 
in Criminal1 causes") with US. CONST. amend. V (proclaiming that "[nlo person 
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"). To- 
ward the end of the same pamphlet the Levellers declared, "And all Laws made, 
or that shall be made contrary to any part of this Agreement, are hereby made 
null and void." LILBURNE T AL., supra, at 168. This phraseology tantalizingly re- 
calls the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. See U.S. CONST. art. VI. Much ink and 
energy might have been saved if the delegates had included in Article VI a clause 
clearly pronouncing unconstitutional laws "null and voidn and specifying which 
branch of government would determine the constitutionality of laws under which 
conditions. For reasons that remain unknown, they did not. 
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Framers considered the authority to disregard unconstitutional 
legislation "a natural part of the total judicial power."129 
Given the historical evidence, this conclusion is more persua- 
sive than the contrary opinion that the Convention did not 
explicitly grant the power of judicial review because it had 
barely considered the concept.lsO 
With these statements by the Constitutional Convention in 
view, the next section will compare Federalist arguments made 
by Publius in The Federalist Papers with Antifederalist argu- 
ments made by Brutus. 
IV. COMPARING BRUTUS AND PLTI~LIUS 
On the topic of judicial review, the most significant news- 
paper exchange to occur between the end of the Constitutional 
Convention and the ratification of the Constitution occurred 
between Brutus and Publius. Brutus was the pseudonym of 
Robert Yates of New York, an Antifederalist; Publius was the 
pseudonym of the authors of the Federalist Papers: Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay.13' The ensuing de- 
bate, waged in the New York press, aimed to decide whether 
New York would join the Union.ls2 
Bmtus argued that federal courts would have the power of 
judicial review. 
[Ilf the legislature [Congress] pass laws, which, in the judg- 
ment of the [Supreme] court, they are not authorised to do by 
129. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at  62. 
Discussion of judicial review at the Constitutional Convention was 
slight. Some commentators have emphasized that both the relative silence 
of the members of the Convention on the subject of judicial review, and 
the silence of the Constitution, is evidence that we cannot know what the 
framers intended with regard to this power. It is altogether reasonable to 
reach another conclusion: to the extent that judicial review was discussed, 
the power was assumed and referred to with approval. At least some 
members of the Convention regarded judicial review as a natural part of 
the judicial power within the constitutional system. 
Id. at 57-58 (footnotes omitted). 
130. "A second fundamental principle on which the delegates were in general 
agreement was that, despite the shakiness of the precedents for the doctrine, the 
courts would by the very nature of their function have the power to strike down 
legislative acts if they were in violation of the Constitution." MCDONALD, supra 
note 65, at  254. 
131. Martin Diamond, The Federalist, in HIS~ORY OF POLITICAL PHILQSOPHY 
659, 659-60 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., 3d ed. 1987). 
132. Id. at 659. 
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the constitution, the court will not take notice of them; for it 
will not be denied, that the constitution is the highest or 
supreme law. And the courts are vested with the supreme and 
uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come 
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot, there- 
fore, execute a law, which, in their judgment, opposes the 
constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior 
law give way to an inferior. The legislature, therefore, will not 
go over the limits by which the courts may adjudge they are 
confined. 133 
This explanation of judicial review bears a striking resem- 
blance to the explanation provided by Publiusl" in Federalist 
78, as will be evident shortly. If nothing else, this statement 
alone shows that the pre-Marbury concept of judicial review 
was not the exclusive property of Alexander Hamilton, the au- 
thor of Federalist 78. 
Brutus also argued that the Supreme Court was dangerous 
because its opinion was final and its members independent. 
"No errors they may commit can be corrected by any power 
above them, if any such power there be, nor can they be re- 
moved from office for making ever so many erroneous adjudica- 
tions."'" At a superficial level, Brutus's first objection is easy 
to dismiss. If a legal system is to have any finality, there must 
be a court from whose decision there is no appeal. It is difficult 
to imagine what legal system Brutus would have advocated in 
its place. Any constitutional "errors" committed by the Supreme 
Court are technically correctable through amendment.lsp 
However, as Brutus may have foreseen, constitutional amend- 
ment is a remedy that corrects erroneous constitutional inter- 
pretations by the Supreme Court only a t  great cost. Other 
branches of government, Congress and the President, are not 
equipped to correct the Supreme Court's errors of constitutional 
interpretation. Such errors are most easily corrected by later 
Court cases-meaning that they are not easily corrected a t  all. 
133. "Brutus" XU, N.Y.J., Feb. 7 & 14, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE DEBATE ON 
THE CONSTITUTION 171, 172 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter DEBATE]. 
134. In referring to the author of the Federalist as "Publius" I follow the late 
Professor Diamond who argued that the pseudonym should be taken seriously, 
especially as regarding the contributions of Alexander Hamilton. Diamond, supra 
note 131, at 660. 
135. "Brutus" Xl, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 133, 
at 129, 129. 
136. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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As for Brutus's objection to the independence of federal judges, 
Publius made an extended response, which will be discussed 
shortly. 
Brutus reasoned that judicial review would give the Su- 
preme Court power to expand federal jurisdiction at the ex- 
pense of the states. He argued that the grant of judicial power 
"in Law and Equity"'" meant that the Supreme Court would 
have the power to decide cases "according to  what appears to 
them, the reason and spirit of the constit~tion."'~~ From the 
power of judicial review and the power of construing the Con- 
stitution in equitable terms,lsg Brutus concluded that "[tlhe 
judicial power will operate to  effect . . . an entire subversion of 
the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the individual 
states."140 
Those who favored ratification found their lasting voice in 
The Federalist. Partly because it is so familiar as a text, a word 
of introduction describing its historical context may be helpful. 
The Federalist was written to  persuade the citizens of New 
York, especially those citizens likely to  influence the outcome of 
the state ratifying convention, to  vote for the Con~titution.'~~ 
However, it was something more, even to  the authors them- 
selves. 
It seems clear that its authors also looked beyond the imme- 
diate struggle' and wrote with a view to influencing later 
generations by making their work the authoritative commen- 
tary on the meaning of the Constitution. While The Federalist 
was the most immediate kind of political work, a piece of 
campaign propaganda, it spoke also to thoughtful men then 
and now, with a view to the permanence of its argument.'42 
Publius's explanation of judicial review in Federalist 78 
may be so well known asto be thought trite. However, it repre- 
sents the most significant pre-Marbury explanation of judicial 
review.'" It tells much about how judicial review was regard- 
ed by the Founders. In rehearsing Publius's argument it is ap- 
propriate to pay special attention to  premises and logical con- 
U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 2 .  
"Brutus" XI ,  supra note 133, at 132. 
Id. at 132-35. 
Id. at 133. 
Diamond, supra note 131, at 659. 
Id. 
See GUNTHER, supm note 8, at 13. 
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nections that, because of the familiarity of Publius's overall 
argument, may otherwise go unnoticed. 
Publius began his explanation for judicial review with two 
important claims. First, a limited constitution1" requires an 
independent judiciary.145 Constitutional limitations (in this 
instance, limitations chiefly on legislative power) can be main- 
tained in practice only through judicial enforcement, since it is 
the duty of courts "to declare all acts contrary to  the manifest 
tenor of the constitution void."'46 Second, reserving rights 
under a constitution without judicial review would be point- 
less.14' What do these claims mean, and what questions do 
they raise? 
By making a limited constitution dependent on the exis- 
tence of an independent judiciary, Publius made what is 
uncontroversial-a universal desire for a limited constitu- 
tion--dependent on the existence of what is controver- 
~ia l '~~-a  genuinely independent judiciary. If sound, his claim 
forces critics either to  abandon the pursuit of a limited con- 
stitution or to accept the necessity of a truly independent judi- 
ciary. 
Publius connected judicial review with the need for an 
independent judiciary when he claimed that judicial review en- 
sures the limits originally imposed by the Constitution. Here it 
is not merely the existence of an independent judiciary that 
matters, but an independent judiciary with the duty and au- 
thority t o  invalidate unconstitutional legislation. Constitutional 
limits would fade away in practice, Publius suggested, without 
the force of judicial review. In this way, Publius responded to 
Brutus's argument that conferring independence on federal 
judges is undesirable because it shields them from being re- 
moved for erroneous adjudication.'" His response implied 
that the benefits of an independent judiciary outweigh the risks 
(however real) of erroneous adjudication. 
144. Hamilton defined a "limited constitution" as one that imposes limits on 
the legislature's authority. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Ham- 
ilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). At a minimum, this definition requires a consti- 
tution not to permit an omnicompetent legislature: government must be prohibited 
from exercising legislative power in specified ways. 
145. See id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. The idea of a judiciary independent of majoritarian processes was alien to 
American experience before the 1780s. Supra note 100. 
149. See "Brutus" XI, supra note 133, at 129. 
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He also connected judicial review with the separation of 
powers. Without judicial review, Publius wrote, it would be 
pointless to reserve on paper what could not be preserved in 
practice. 
Will it be sufficient to mark with precision the bound- 
aries of these departments in the Constitution of the govern- 
ment, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the 
encroaching spirit of power? This is  the security which ap- 
pears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of 
most of the American [state] Constitutions. But experience 
assures us, that the efficacy of the provision has been greatly 
over-rated; and that some more adequate defence is indis- 
pensably necessary for the more feeble, against the more 
powerful members of the government. The legislative depart- 
ment is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and 
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.150 
From this it follows that both a limited constitution and the 
separation of powers depend for their practical effectuation on 
the existence of judicial review. 
Publius then replied to the argument that judicial review 
makes the judiciary superior to the legislature. This argument, 
he perceived, depends on the proposition that "the authority 
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 144, at 332-33 (James Madison) (em- 
phasis added). By his reference to unadorned declarations of the principle of sepa- 
ration of powers, Madison was probably thinking of declarations like those then 
contained in the constitutions of Virginia and Massachusetts. 
The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate 
and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the 
other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of 
them, at the same time; except that the Justices of the County Courts 
shall be eligible to either House of Assembly. 
VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES 
C O N ~ I O N S  52 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979). The Virginia Constitution of 
1776 thus provided only a single exception to its declaration of the principle of 
separation of powers: "Justices of the County Courts" could run for a seat in the 
state legislature. Id. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 allowed for no excep- 
tions at all. 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department 
shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; 
the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or 
either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and execu- 
tive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of 
laws, and not of men. 
MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in 5 id. at 96. 
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which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be 
superior to  the one whose acts may be declared void."lsl 
Publius's response to  this argument moved through several 
stages. He began w-ith the principle that "every act of a dele- 
gated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under 
which it is exercised, is void."ls2 In support of this principle, 
Publius launched an argument ad absurdum. If this principle 
were not true, he wrote, deputy would govern principal, servant 
would rule master, popular representatives would be superior 
to  the people whom they represent, and people acting by virtue 
of delegated power "may do not only what their powers do not 
authorise, but what they forbid."ls3 Since these propositions 
are absurd, Publius implied, the principle of judicial review 
must be true. 
Next he addressed the argument that Congress is autho- 
rized to  make its own interpretations of the constitutionality of 
its acts. He challenged this argument on two grounds. First, 
the argument cannot be presumed without explicit textual 
support, which, Publius suggested, the Constitution does not 
provide. Also, one cannot presume that the Constitution autho- 
rizes congressional representatives "to substitute their will to  
that of their  constituent^."'^^ This objection simply restates a 
form of the principle he earlier defended: every legislative act 
must conform itself to  the constituent acts of the people, or it is 
void. 
In place of these misunderstandings of judicial power, 
Publius offered a particular understanding of the place and ap- 
propriate role of judicial power within the political system 
created and anticipated by the new constitution. "It is far more 
rational to  suppose that the courts were designed to be an in- 
termediate body between the people and the legislature, in 
order, among other things, to  keep the latter within the limits 
assigned to their a~thority."'~ Publius thus declared that the 
federal judiciary was designed to  check the tendency of legisla- 
tures to exceed their authority.15' 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 144, at 524. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. at 525. 
See id. at 524-25. 
Id. at 525. 
See id. 
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If this proposition is true, two inferences follow: legislative 
power can pose a genuine threat to  constitutional government, 
and the federal judiciary has the constitutional authority to  
repel that threat. Publius's statement also means that the Con- 
stitution imposes certain limits on legislative authority. (He 
made that clear by earlier defining the Constitution as a limit- 
ed constitution and a limited constitution as one that imposes 
limits on legislative authority.)'" The threat Publius per- 
ceived is the possibility of the legislature-in this instance Con- 
gress--exceeding its constitutional authority. By his claim that 
the Constitution authorizes the federal judiciary t o  enforce the 
constitutional limits on congressional action, Publius articu- 
lated a significant constitutional role for federal judges. They 
were to be not merely the arbiters of disputes between states or 
individuals, but the means by which popularly elected legisla- 
tors are prevented from stepping outside their constitutional 
bounds. Publius conceived of judicial review as a significant 
check on legislative power. Thus the idea of judicial review 
acting as a check on legislative authority did not originate in 
the fertile mind of Justice Marshall. 
How did Publius justify authorizing judges to  invalidate 
legislation duly passed by popular representatives? He did so 
first by defining the Constitution as fundamental law.'" 
Since legal interpretation properly belongs with the courts,160 
and since constitutional interpretation is a subset of legal in- 
terpretation, courts have authority to interpret the Constitution 
just as they have the authority t o  interpret a piece of ordinary 
legislation. 16' 
Although it might be possible to conceive of a constitution 
that is not defined as fundamental law, two considerations 
weigh against interpreting the American Constitution in that 
manner. First, the Constitution itself states that it is "the su- 
preme Law of the Land."'" While Article VI also categorizes 
federal laws and treaties as supreme law, the Constitution 
appears first in that list, a textual placement that has been 
generally interpreted to indicate the superiority of the Consti- 
tution over the other two kinds of law.'" Second, not defining 
158. Id. at 524. 
159. Id. at 525. 
160. Id. 
161. See id. 
162. U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
163. See Reid v. Covert, 354 US.  1 (1957) (holding that the Constitution is 
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the Constitution as fundamental law, which can be judicially 
interpreted and applied, raises serious problems of enforce- 
ment. How should constitutional limits be enforced if not 
through the courts? Should we trust Congress to enforce the 
constitutional limits on its own authority? If one chooses not to 
enforce a constitution at all, what means can prevent a legisla- 
ture from usurping more power than the constitution authoriz- 
es? Without enforcing the limits on congressional power, could 
we honestly call our Constitution limited in any meaningful 
sense of the term? 
Publius next considered judicial review itself: What should 
a court do when faced with "an irreconcileable variance"164 
between an ordinary statute and a constitutional provision? 
"[Tlhat which has the superior obligation and validity ought of 
course to be preferred; or in other words, the constitution ought 
to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people t o  the 
intention of their agents."'" This statement has been so often 
repeated that it may be useful t o  unpack its logic. 
First, Publius began with the premise of "irreconcileable 
varian~e" '~ between an ordinary act of Congress and a provi- 
sion of the Constitution. What that means Publius did not 
explain, but it seems fair to  say that the variance could not be 
slight or superficial to qualify as "irreconcileable." At least it 
means that Publius envisioned the exercise of judicial review 
when a court could not consistently apply both a statute and a 
constitutional provision to decide a case. 
Second, Publius said that a subordinate law must yield to  
a superior one. That proposition states a truism, but it does not 
necessarily follow, as Publius tried to  suggest, that the Con- 
stitution is superior to congressional statutes. One can conceive 
of a reasonable political regime in which a constitution is de- 
fined as law, but law that may yield to a strong legislative 
mandate, such as a three-fourths vote. Only when a constitu- 
tion is defined as fundamental law, as law superior to  every 
other category of law, does Publius's argument necessarily fol- 
low. For if the Constitution is fundamental law, Publius sound- 
ly argued that every law that is not fundamental must yield to  
superior to treaties); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187, 177-78 (1803) 
(holding that the Constitution is superior to ordinary statutes). 
164. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 144, at 525. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
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constitutional law. This step in Publius's argument therefore 
depends on the premise that the Constitution is fundamental 
law. Publius concluded that "the power of the pe~ple"'~' is 
superior to  both legislatures and courts; neither body is superi- 
or to the other? 
Comparison with Brutus's argument at this stage is en- 
lightening. Brutus and Publius agreed on their description of 
judicial review in nearly every detail: the grant of judicial au- 
thority entailed the power of judicial review, which would oper- 
ate on state and federal courts alike. However, they disagreed 
about what judicial review meant for the states and the rela- 
tive power of courts and legislatures. Brutus thought judicial 
review meant the "subver~ion"'~~ of the states, while Publius 
thought it meant the protection of the people from legislative 
encroachments. Their point of disagreement therefore did not 
turn on the existence or nonexistence of judicial review. It did 
not even turn on the scope of judicial review. It turned solely 
on the question whether judicial review would yield desirable 
consequences for the American people, and the answer to that 
question depended on whether one viewed the states as protec- 
tive or oppressive of individual rights. Judicial review was ac- 
knowledged by Federalist and Antifederalist alike to be a fact 
of the new constitutional regime. 
Both Constitutional Convention records and succeeding 
debates in the press demonstrate that the concept of judicial 
review was widely discussed long before Justice Marshall de- 
cided Marbury v. Madison. But was the concept raised in the 
state ratifying conventions? 
Several delegates to  the state ratifying conventions spoke 
about judicial review. What follows will be only a sample of 
such remarks, but it is an important sample. The records of the 
ratifying conventions are often-I think unduly-ignored. We 
have some evidence that Madison, the guiding force behind the 
writing and adoption of the Constitution, thought them the 
most important historical evidence of constitutional meaning. 
In a letter to  Major Henry Lee, Madison wrote, 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. "Brutus" XI, supra note 133, at 133. 
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I entirely concur in the propriety of resorting to the sense in 
which the Constitution was accepted and ratified by the na- 
tion. In that sense alone it is the legitimate Constitution. And 
if that be not the guide in expounding it, there can be no 
security for a consistent and stable, more than for a faithfbl, 
exercise of its  power^."^ 
Leaving aside the question of ranking the historical records in 
order of relative importance, I will now present some illustra- 
tive remarks about judicial review made by delegates to the 
state ratifying conventions. These remarks will receive only a 
brief introduction, because they largely reiterate a theory of 
judicial review already discussed at length. 
In the Connecticut Convention, Oliver Ellsworth made the 
same co~ections between judicial independence, popular sov- 
ereignty, and judicial review for which Publius argued at 
length. 
This constitution defines the extent of the powers of the 
general government. If the general legislature should a t  any 
time overleap their limits, the judicial department is a consti- 
tutional check. If the United States go beyond their powers, if 
they make a law which the constitution does not authorise, i t  
is void; and the judicial power, the national judges, who to 
secure their impartiality are to be made independent, will 
declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the states go be- 
yond their limits, if they make a law which is an usurpation 
upon the general government, the law is void, and upright 
independent judges will declare it to be so.17' 
James Wilson made a similar statement, with even more 
clarity, in the Philadelphia Convention. His statement is partic- 
ularly significant because of his status as "second only t o  Madi- 
son in terms of his influence on the drafting of the Constitu- 
ti~n."l'~ 
I had occasion, on a former day, to state that the power of the 
constitution was paramount to the power of the legislature, 
acting under that constitution. For i t  is possible that the 
170. Letter from James Madison to H. Lee (June 25, 1824), in 3 LE'~TERs AND 
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNRED STATES 
442 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865). 
171. Oliver Ellsworth, Speech to the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 7, 
1788), reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 133, at 877, 883. 
172. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at 59. 
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legislature, when acting in that capacity, may transgress the 
bounds assigned to it, and an act may pass, in the usual 
mode, notwithstanding that transgression; but when it comes 
to be discussed before the judges-when they consider its 
principles, and find i t  to be incompatible with the superior 
power of the constitution, it is their duty to pronounce i t  void; 
and judges independent, and not obliged to look to every ses- 
sion, for a continuance of their salaries, will behave with 
intrepidity, and refuse to act the sanction of judicial 
authority.'" 
Other statements came from two surprising quarters in the ' 
Virginia Convention. First, Patrick Henry, who led the Virginia 
anti federalist^,'^^ objected to the Constitution because he 
was unsure whether federal judges would rule invalid congres- 
sional acts that exceeded constitutional bounds. 
The Honorable Gentleman did our Judiciary honour in 
saying, that they had firmness to counteract the Legislature 
in some cases. Yes, Sir, our Judges opposed the acts of the 
Legislature. We have this land mark to guide us.-They had 
fortitude to declare that they were the Judiciary and would 
oppose unconstitutional acts. Are you sure that your Federal 
Judiciary will act thus? Is that Judiciary so well constructed 
and so independent of the other branches, as our State Judi- 
ciary? Where are your land-marks in this Government? I will 
be bold to say you cannot find any in it. I take it as the high- 
est encomium on this country, that the acts of the Legisla- 
ture, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by the Judi- 
ciary. '" 
Second, in what may be the most surprising remark of all, 
John Marshall himself spoke of judicial review as a protec- 
tion-maybe the only effective protection-against unconsti- 
tutional acts by government. "To what quarter will you look for 
protection from an infringement on the Constitution, if you will 
not give the power to the Judiciary? There is no other body 
that  can afford such a pr~tection."'~~ 
173. James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 1, 
1787), reprinted in 1 DEBATE, supra note 133, at 820, 823. 
174. See CLWTON, supra note 13, at 68. 
175. Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 12, 
1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 133, at 673, 684-85. 
176. John Marshall, Speech to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 
1788), reprinted in 2 DEBATE, supra note 133, at 730, 732-33. 
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In short, delegates from every region and from both 
Antifederalist and Federalist camps delivered clear remarks 
about the existence and importance of judicial review for the 
new constitutional regime. Once again, Justice Marshall's sup- 
posed innovation in Marbury appears less than innovative. 
Remarks by delegates to  the Constitutional Convention, Wil- 
son's statement to the Pennsylvania Convention, and argu- 
ments by Publius and Brutus together form a coherent theory 
of judicial review,'?' which was available to Justice Marshall 
when he wrote the Court's opinion in Marbury. 
VI.  SHAPING THE DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
This Comment began by asking what the Founders said 
about judicial review. The historical evidence presented here 
demonstrates that they said more about it than is commonly 
supposed. Many of the most influential Founders spoke of ju- 
dicial review as if it were a part of the authority granted to 
courts by the Constitution. And they mainly agreed that the 
principal benefit of judicial review is that it would keep legisla- 
tures, both federal and state, from straying outside the bound- 
aries marked by the Constitution. 
In Federalist 51, Publius made a well-known statement 
about the design and purpose behind the Constitution, as ex- 
emplified by its application of the separation of powers. It will 
shed some light on the Founders' theory of judicial review. 
But the great security against a gradual concentration of 
the several powers in the same department, consists in giving 
to those who administer each department, the necessary con- 
stitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroach- 
ments of the others. . . . Ambition must be made to counteract 
ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the 
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on 
human nature, that such devices should be necessary to 
controul the abuses of government. But what is government 
itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary. If an- 
gels were to govern men, neither external nor internal 
controuls on government would be necessary. In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the 
government to controul the governed; and in the next place, 
177. See Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, a t  63. 
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oblige it to controul itself. A dependence on the people is no 
doubt the primary controul on the government; but experience 
has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precau- 
tions. 
Here Publius explains that the basic political principle, the 
separation of powers, would languish in practice if not for the 
"auxiliary precautions" commonly known as checks and balanc- 
es. Supposed violations of the separation of powers, such as the 
participation of the President in legislation through the exer- 
cise of veto power,17g are paradoxically devices to keep the 
separation of powers from becoming only a paper declaration. 
By articulating statements made by the Founders about 
judicial review as a coherent theory, and by applying the same 
kind of reasoning to judicial review that Publius applied to the 
separation of powers and checks and balances, it is possible to 
see how the Founders could have defended their theory of judi- 
cial review as coherent and cogent. Popular sovereignty is a 
fundamental political principle in our society. But a constitu- 
tional declaration that the people are sovereign would not be 
enough, in practice, to maintain the integrity of the princ- 
iple.l8' Without some means of ensuring fidelity to the largest 
exertions of popular sovereignty-the political commitments 
recorded in constitutional text-popular sovereignty would 
exist in name only. The "auxiliary precaution" designed to 
maintain that fidelity is judicial review. 
Judicial review stands in a paradoxical relationship to 
popular sovereignty. Just  as checks and balances appear to 
violate the principle of the separation of powers by involving 
each branch in the business of the others, judicial review ap- 
pears to violate the principle of popular sovereignty by allowing 
unelected judges to invalidate the acts of popularly elected 
representatives. However, if we accept Publius's reasoning, it is 
necessary to allow some violations of the principle in theory to 
preserve the principle in practice. Given the connection many 
178. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 144, at 349 (James Madison). 
179. See US. CONST. art. I, 8 7. 
180. During the Constitutional Convention, Madison acknowledged the necessity 
of checking legislative power. "Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful 
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real 
source of danger to the American Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving 
every defensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with repub- 
lican principles." 2 RECORDS, supra note 15, at 74; see also supra note 150 and 
accompanying text (discussing a similar statement by Madison in The Federalist). 
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Framers drew between judicial review and popular sovereignty, 
it is fair t o  say that judicial review was designed t o  preserve 
popular sovereignty, not destroy it. Judicial review was de- 
signed to  hold governmeni faithful to  the constitutional com- 
mitments of the people. 
This early theory of judicial review ought to  be treated as 
the appropriate reference point when discussing the proper 
scope of the exercise of judicial review. Without such an histori- 
cal reference point, constitutional theory can slip its moorings 
and drift rudderless on a sea of so-called pure theory.''' A 
theory designed without regard for history obscures more than 
it clarifies in a field as deeply influenced by the of the 
past as constitutional law. The early theory of judicial review 
provides a means of getting one's bearings and maintaining 
close ties with the changing realities of our national life. How- 
ever, it should not be taken for more than that-especially not 
as a fmal resting place. Serious, robust discussion about the 
proper scope of the Court's exercise of judicial review ought t o  
continue because it has intrinsic value. But it remains valuable 
only so far as it is tempered by an acute awareness of history. 
Returning to the question of historical legitimacy, the 
weight of evidence falls against the opinion of Crosskey, Hand, 
and others. Marshall did not need to  invent the concept of judi- 
cial review; it had been already conceived and discussed by del- 
egates to  the Constitutional Convention, by Brutus and Publi- 
us, and by members of the state ratifying conventions. "The 
Marshall Court did not create judicial review. Rather, it pre- 
sented a classical statement on behalf of judicial review."'82 
Therefore, to the degree that scholars conceive of judicial 
review as resting on an historical basis of questionable legiti- 
macy,la both the policymaking conception of judicial review 
held by the Cooper Court and the legislative deference ex- 
pressed by the Williamson Court ought to  be rejected. The Su- 
preme Court has no historical support to occupy either the 
zenith of the American constitutional order or its nadir. If 
these conceptual extremes were rejected, there would remain a 
wide range of alternative ways of discussing judicial review 
whose soundness scholars and practitioners would continue to 
fruitfully debate. But the extremes represented by Cooper and 
181. See CLINTON, supra note 13, at 10. 
182. Dionisopoulos & Peterson, supra note 127, at 75. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44. 
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Williamon should be no longer treated as serious theoretical 
positions. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Judicial review was not the invention of Chief Justice Mar- 
shall and the Supreme Court in Marbury u. Madison. The his- 
torical evidence presented in this Comment demonstrates in- 
stead that a coherent theory of judicial review already existed, 
which enabled Marshall to  decide Marbury without resorting to 
a judicial version of Original Sin.lS4 Contrary to  Judge Hand 
and Professor Crosskey, the history of constitutional drafting 
and ratification shows that the historical roots of judicial re- 
view run deep into constitutional soil. This historical conclusion 
undermines the Court's conception of its power in Cooper u. 
Aaron and Williamson u. Lee Optical Co.; judicial review con- 
fers on the Court neither the power to range across the consti- 
tutional landscape looking for violations to correctla5 nor the 
power to  cloister itself from cases that present a conflict be- 
tween a statute and the Constitution.lsp These extreme posi- 
tions in the discussion of judicial review should be abandoned 
as historically baseless. We should resolve to abandon them 
and to  use the early theory of judicial review as a point of ref- 
erence. By doing so, we would reshape the discussion of judicial 
review. Could such reshaping free us to discuss in more fruitful 
and, perhaps, less polarizing ways the constitutional power of 
judges to address our nation's most vexing political disputes? 
Shawn Gunnarson 
184. Cf.  CLINTON, supra note 13, at 6 (contending that the orthodox reading of 
Marbury leads to the opinion that "judicial review is thereby tainted with some- 
thing like original sin"). 
185. See id. at 29. 
186. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtuesn--A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (1964). 
